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Abstract—We consider an edge computing scenario where
users want to perform a linear computation on local, private
data and a network-wide, public matrix. The users offload
computations to edge servers located at the edge of the network,
but do not want the servers, or any other party with access
to the wireless links, to gain any information about their data.
We provide a scheme that guarantees information-theoretic user
data privacy against an eavesdropper with access to a number
of edge servers or their corresponding communication links. The
proposed scheme utilizes secret sharing and partial replication
to provide privacy, mitigate the effect of straggling servers, and
to allow for joint beamforming opportunities in the download
phase, in order to minimize the overall latency, consisting of
upload, computation, and download latencies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Edge computing has established itself as a pillar of the 5G
mobile network [1] to guarantee very low-latency and high-
bandwidth computing services. The key idea is to move the
computation power from the cloud closer to where data is
generated, by pooling the available resources at the network
edge.
Processing data in a distributed fashion over a number of
edge servers poses significant challenges. In particular, edge
servers may fail, be inaccessible, or straggle. The straggler
problem has recently been addressed in the context of dis-
tributed computing in data centers (over the cloud), where
coding has been shown to be a powerful tool to reduce the
computational latency due to straggling servers [2]–[5]. The
idea is to generate redundant computations by means of an
erasure correcting code such that the partial computations of
a subset of the servers suffice to complete the whole com-
putation, thus providing resiliency to straggling (and failing)
servers. The same concept can be applied in edge computing.
In this scenario, besides the computational latency due to
straggling servers, the communication latency of uploading
and downloading data to the servers is of utmost importance,
due to severe bandwidth limitations.
To reduce the communication latency, in [6], [7] subtasks
were replicated across edge servers to enable cooperation
opportunities to send results back to the users via joint
beamforming. More recently, [8], [9] combined both straggler
coding using a maximum distance separable (MDS) code
and joint beamforming to reduce the overall latency. Another
important challenge when processing data over heterogeneous,
untrusted edge servers is guaranteeing the privacy of the user
data. Recently, this problem has been addressed in the context
of distributed computing in data centers in the presence of
straggling servers [10], [11]. These works use secret sharing
ideas to provide both privacy and robustness against stragglers.
In this paper, we propose a privacy-preserving edge com-
puting scheme that exploits straggler coding and partial repli-
cations across servers to reduce latency. To the best of our
knowledge, this problem has not been considered before in
the literature. In particular, we consider a similar scenario
to the one in [8] where multiple users wish to perform a
linear inference on some local data given a network-wide,
public matrix. Practical examples where such a scenario arises
include recommender systems via collaborative filtering.
For this scenario, we present a scheme that guarantees
information-theoretic user data privacy against an eaves-
dropper with access to a number of edge servers or their
corresponding communication links. The proposed scheme
utilizes secret sharing to provide both privacy and mitigate
the effect of straggling servers. Furthermore, by replicating
computations across different servers the scheme allows for
joint beamforming opportunities. The proposed scheme entails
an inherent tradeoff between computational latency due to
stragglers, communication latency, and user data privacy. For a
given privacy level, we optimize the parameters of the scheme
in order to minimize the overall latency incurred by the upload
and download of data as well as the computation. For the
lowest privacy level, i.e., privacy against a single untrusted
server, the proposed scheme yields an increase in latency in the
worst case by a moderate factor of about 2.4 compared to the
nonprivate scheme in [8] for the selected system parameters.
Notation: Vectors and matrices are written in lowercase
and uppercase bold letters, respectively, e.g., a and A. The
transpose of vectors and matrices is denoted by (·)>. GF(q)
denotes the finite field of order q and N denotes the positive
integers. We use the notation [a] to represent the set of integers
{0, 1, . . . , a − 1}. Furthermore, da/be is the smallest integer
larger than or equal to a/b, ba/bc is the largest integer smaller
than or equal to a/b, and (a)b is the integer a modulo b. We
represent permutations in cycle notation, e.g., the permutation
pi = (0 2 1 3) maps 0 7→ 2, 2 7→ 1, 1 7→ 3, and 3 7→ 0. In
addition, pi(i) is the image of i under pi, e.g., pi(0) = 2. The
expected value of a random variable X is denoted by E[X].
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider the system in Fig. 1 with u users u0, . . . , uu−1,
where the data of user ui is represented by the vector
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Fig. 1. An edge computing network with two users and three ENs.
xi = (xi,0, . . . , xi,r−1)> ∈ GF(q)r. Each user ui wants to
perform a computation-intensive linear inference Wxi, where
W ∈ GF(q)m×r, in a distributed fashion over e edge nodes
(ENs) e0, . . . , ee−1 located at the edge of the network. For
ease of notation we will refer to the set {Wxi | i ∈ [u]} as
{Wxi} and to {xi | i ∈ [u]} as {xi}. The matrix W stays
constant for a sufficiently long period of time, and each EN has
a storage capacity corresponding to a fraction µ, 0 < µ ≤ 1,
of the matrix W , which is assumed to be public. Moreover,
we assume that each user is connected by e unicast wireless
links to the e ENs.
A. Computation Runtime Model
The ENs may straggle, which is represented by a random
setup time λj for each EN ej . The setup time is the time
it takes an EN to start computing after it has received the
necessary data. As in [8], [12], [13], we assume that the
setup times are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
according to an exponential distribution with parameter η, such
that E[λj ] = 1/η. The time it takes an EN to compute one
inner product in GF(q)r for each of the users is deterministic
and denoted by τ . Thus, the latency incurred by EN ej to
compute d inner products for each user (u · d inner products
in total) is
Lcompj = λj + dτ.
We define the normalized computation latency of EN ej as
L˜compj =
Lcompj
τ
=
λj
τ
+ d.
B. Communication
Both the upload of data from the users to the ENs and the
download of the results of the computations from the ENs
to the users is considered. We denote by γ the normalized
communication latency of unicasting u symbols from GF(q)
in the upload or download. In the uplink, each user unicasts its
data vector for computation to the ENs. In the downlink, ENs
having access to the same symbol can collaboratively transmit
to multiple users at the same time and thereby reduce the
communication latency by exploiting joint beamforming op-
portunities [6]–[9], [14], [15]. In particular, a symbol available
at ρ ENs can be transmitted simultaneously to min{ρ, u} users
with a normalized communication latency of γ/min{ρ, u} in
the high signal-to-noise (SNR) region. The normalized com-
munication latency, in the high SNR region, of transmitting v
symbols, where symbol αi, i ∈ [v], is available at ρi ENs, is
L˜comm,down = γ
v−1∑
i=0
1
min{ρi, u} .
C. Privacy and Problem Formulation
We consider a scenario where some of the ENs or their
corresponding communication links are compromised. In par-
ticular, we assume the presence of an eavesdropper with access
to any z ENs or their corresponding communication links.
The goal is to offload computations to the (untrusted) ENs
in such a way that they do not gain any information in an
information-theoretic sense (zero mutual information) about
neither the user data {xi} nor the results of the computations
{Wxi}, while minimizing the overall normalized latency,
consisting of upload, computation, and download latencies.
III. PRIVATE DISTRIBUTED LINEAR INFERENCE
In this section, we present a distributed linear inference
computation scheme that provides user data privacy against an
eavesdropper with access to any z ENs or their corresponding
communication links. At the heart of the proposed scheme
lies Shamir’s secret sharing scheme (SSS) [16]. An SSS with
parameters (n, k), n ≥ k, ensures that some private data can
be shared with n parties in such a way that any k−1 colluding
parties do not learn anything about the data. On the other hand,
any set of k or more parties can recover the data.
For each user ui, an (n, k) SSS is used to compute n shares
of its private data xi = (xi,0, . . . , xi,r−1)>. In particular, for
user ui we encode each data entry xi,l along with k− 1 i.i.d.
uniform random symbols r(1)i,l , . . . , r
(k−1)
i,l from GF(q) using
an (n, k) Reed-Solomon (RS) code to obtain n coded symbols
s
(0)
i,l , . . . , s
(n−1)
i,l . For each h ∈ [n], the (h+1)-th share of user
ui is
s
(h)
i =
(
s
(h)
i,0 , . . . , s
(h)
i,r−1
)>
.
Finally, define the matrix of shares
S(h) =
(
s
(h)
0 , s
(h)
1 , . . . , s
(h)
u−1
)
∈ GF(q)r×u (1)
as the matrix collecting the (h+ 1)-th share of all users.
The following theorem proves that the original computations
{Wxi} of all users can be recovered from a given set of com-
putations based on the matrices of shares S(0), . . . ,S(n−1),
while providing privacy against an eavesdropper with access
to at most k − 1 distinct matrices of shares.
Theorem 1. Consider u users with their respective private
data xi ∈ GF(q)r, i ∈ [u]. Use Shamir’s (n, k) SSS on each
xi to obtain the matrices of shares S(0), . . . ,S(n−1) in (1).
Let W ∈ GF(q)m×r be a public matrix and I ⊆ [n] a set of
indices with cardinality |I| = k. Then, the set of computations
{WS(h) | h ∈ I} allows to recover the computations {Wxi}
of all users. Moreover, for any set J ⊆ [n] with |J | < k,
{WS(h) | h ∈ J } reveals no information about {Wxi}.
Proof: Let C be the (n, k) RS code used in the SSS.
For each h ∈ [n], the entries of the rows of S(h) are code
symbols in position h of codewords from C pertaining to
different users. More precisely, for each user ui, each row
of the matrix
(
s
(0)
i , s
(1)
i , . . . , s
(n−1)
i
)
of all n shares of ui is
a codeword from C. Since C is a linear code, each of the m
rows of the matrix
W
(
s
(0)
i , s
(1)
i , . . . , s
(n−1)
i
)
is a codeword of C. Furthermore, the messages obtained by
decoding these codewords are the rows of(
Wxi,Wr
(1)
i , . . . ,Wr
(k−1)
i
)
,
where {r(κ)i = (r(κ)i,0 , . . . , r(κ)i,r−1)> | κ ∈ [k]\{0}} is the set
of vectors of uniform random symbols used by user ui in the
computation of the shares s(h)i , h ∈ [n]. Then, decoding the
vectors in the set {Ws(h)i | h ∈ I} gives Wxi, and it follows
that {WS(h) | h ∈ I} gives {Wxi}.
From the properties of Shamir’s SSS it follows that the
mutual information between {S(h) | h ∈ J } and {xi} is zero.
Subsequently, from the data processing inequality it follows
that {WS(h) | h ∈ J } reveals no information about {xi}.
The following corollary gives a sufficient condition to
recover the private computations {Wxi}.
Corollary 1 (Sufficient recovery condition). Consider an edge
computing scenario, where the public matrix W is partitioned
into b disjoint submatrices Wl ∈ GF(q)
m
b ×r, l ∈ [b], and the
private data is {xi}. Then, the private computations {Wxi}
can be recovered from the computations in the sets
Sl , {WlS(h) | h ∈ I}, l ∈ [b], (2)
for any fixed set I ⊆ [n] with cardinality |I| = k.
Proof: From Theorem 1, for a given l ∈ [b], the
computations in the set {Wlxi} can be recovered from the
computations in the set Sl. Then, we obtain
Wxi =
(
(W0xi)
>, (W1xi)>, . . . , (Wb−1xi)>
)>
, ∀i ∈ [u].
In the following, we present a scheme that fulfills the
sufficient recovery condition in Corollary 1. Note that it may
be beneficial to repeat shares over several ENs in order to
exploit broadcasting opportunities during the download phase.
This presents difficulties in the design of a private scheme,
because repeating shares at different nodes results in a privacy
level z lower than that of the SSS (k). For example, if all
ENs have access to two matrices of shares, the scheme only
provides privacy against any z = b(k − 1)/2c colluding ENs.
Given the underlying SSS, the proposed scheme can be
broken down into two combinatorial problems. The first cor-
responds to the assignment of the submatrices {Wl | l ∈ [b]}
to the e ENs such that no EN stores more than a fraction µ
of W . The second corresponds to the assignment of the n
matrices of shares {S(h) | h ∈ [n]} to the ENs such that the
users are guaranteed to obtain the computations in (2).
A. Assignment of W to the Edge Nodes
We start by explaining the assignment of the submatrices
of W to the ENs such that no EN stores more than a
fraction µ of W , while the users are guaranteed to recover
their computations {Wxi}. Additionally, we would like to
allow for replications across different ENs to allow for joint
beamforming in the download phase.
In order to satisfy the storage requirement, we select p ∈ N
such that p/e ≤ µ and partition W into b = e submatrices as
W =
(
W>0 ,W
>
1 , . . . ,W
>
e−1
)>
.
We then assign p submatrices to each of the e ENs. The as-
signment has the following combinatorial structure. Consider
a cyclic permutation group of order e with generator pi. We
construct an index matrix
Iw ,

pi0(0) pi0(1) · · · pi0(e− 1)
pi1(0) pi1(1) · · · pi1(e− 1)
...
...
. . .
...
pip−1(0) pip−1(1) · · · pip−1(e− 1)
 (3)
and define the set of indices
Iwj = {pi0(j), . . . , pip−1(j)} (4)
for j ∈ [e] as the set containing the elements in column j of
Iw. Then, we assign the submatrices {Wl | l ∈ Iwj } to EN ej .
For example, if pi = (0 e− 1 e− 2 · · · 1), we have
Iw =

0 1 · · · e− 1
e− 1 0 · · · e− 2
...
...
. . .
...
e− p+ 1 e− p+ 2 · · · e− p
 ,
and EN e1 stores W1,W0,We−1, . . . ,We−p+2.
The ENs process the assigned submatrices of W in the
same order as their indices appear in the rows of Iw, and we
define φwj (l) for l ∈ [p] to be the map to the index of the
(l + 1)-th assigned submatrix of EN ej .
B. Assignment of Shares to the Edge Nodes
Given the assignment of the submatrices of W , we now
have to assign the shares in such a way that we can guarantee
that the users obtain the computations in (2). The users upload
their shares to the e ENs according to the following assign-
ment. Given the generator pi used to assign the submatrices of
W to the ENs, we construct a (β + 1)× e index matrix
Is =

pi0(0) pi0(1) · · · pi0(e− 1)
pie−p(0) pie−p(1) · · · pie−p(e− 1)
...
...
. . .
...
piβ(e−p)(0) piβ(e−p)(1) · · · piβ(e−p)(e− 1)
, (5)
where β = de/pe − 1. Define the set of indices
Isj = {pi0(j), . . . , piβ(e−p)(j)}\{n, n+ 1, . . . , e− 1} (6)
as the subset of elements in column j of Is that are in [n]. User
ui transmits the shares {s(h)i | h ∈ Isj} to EN ej . Thereby,
every EN receives a = dde/pe · n/ee shares from each user as
we keep only a fraction dn/ee of the shares corresponding to
the β+1 = de/pe used permutations in Is, i.e., of the indices in
[e] we keep only those in [n]. As for the submatrices of W , the
shares are processed in the same order as their indices appear
in the rows of Is, and we define φsj(h) for h ∈ [a] to be the
map to the index of the (h+ 1)-th assigned matrix of shares
of EN ej . For a given matrix of shares assigned to an EN,
all assigned submatrices of W are processed before moving
on to the next matrix of shares. What remains to be shown is
that these combined assignments of submatrices and shares to
the ENs allow all users to obtain enough partial computations
from the e ENs to retrieve their desired computations.
Theorem 2. Consider an edge computing network consisting
of u users and e ENs, each with a storage capacity corre-
sponding to a fraction µ, 0 < µ ≤ 1, of W , and an (n, k)
SSS, with n ≤ e. For j ∈ [e], EN ej stores the submatrices
of W from the set {Wl | l ∈ Iwj } with Iwj defined in (4).
Furthermore, it receives the matrices of shares from the set
{S(h) | h ∈ Isj} with Isj defined in (6), and computes and
returns the set {WlS(h) | l ∈ Iwj , h ∈ Isj} to the users. Then,
all users can recover their desired computations {Wxi}.
Due to lack of space, we omit the proof of Theorem 2. We
motivate the theorem, however, with the following example.
Example 1. Consider e = n = 5, p = 3, and pi = (0 3 1 4 2),
the generator of a cyclic permutation group of order 5.
From (3) and (5), we have
Iw =
0 1 2 3 43 4 0 1 2
1 2 3 4 0
 and Is = (0 1 2 3 41 2 3 4 0
)
.
We focus on the matrix of shares S(0). It is assigned to EN
e0 and gets multiplied with the submatrices of W indexed by
the elements of the set
Iw0 = {pi0(0), pi(0), pi2(0)} = {0, 3, 1}.
Note that the set Iw0 contains three recursively pi-permuted
integers of 0 (pi0(0), pi1(0), and pi2(0)). Now, consider EN e4,
which is also assigned the matrix of shares S(0). We have
Iw4 = {pi0(4), pi(4), pi2(4)} = {4, 2, 0}.
Notice that pi0(4) = pi3(0) = 4 is the fourth recursively pi-
permuted integer of 0. Hence, the set Iw0 ∪Iw4 contains in total
six recursively pi-permuted integers of 0, which is sufficient to
give the set [5], since the group generated by pi is transitive. In
a similar way, it can be shown that the same property holds for
all other matrices of shares. Therefore, each matrix of shares
is multiplied with all submatrices of W , and the sets in (2)
are obtained.
IV. COMMUNICATION AND COMPUTATION SCHEDULING
In this section, we describe the scheduling of uploading the
assigned shares to the ENs, performing the computations, and
downloading a subset of {WlS(h) | l ∈ Iwj , h ∈ Isj , j ∈ [e]}.
In the following, we refer to a single WlS(h) as an interme-
diate result (IR).
A. Upload and Computation
As W stays constant for a long time, the assignment of
the submatrices {Wl | l ∈ [e]} can be done offline and does
not affect the overall latency. The online phase starts with
the upload of the shares. In contrast to the nonprivate scheme
in [8], a user ui can not broadcast one vector to all ENs.
Instead, the user has to unicast a number of shares to each
EN to assure that any z ENs do not obtain any information
about xi. In general, broadcasting a message to e receivers
is more expensive than transmitting a single unicast message
to one receiver. As in [2], we assume that broadcasting to e
receivers is a factor log(e) more expensive in terms of latency
than a single unicast. Recall that the cost (or normalized
latency) of unicasting u symbols from GF(q) is γ. Hence,
in the nonprivate scheme the normalized latency of every
user broadcasting one vector from GF(q)r to all e ENs is
L˜upNP = γ · r · log(e).
In contrast, the normalized latency of unicasting u shares,
one from each user, which are elements in GF(q)r, to one
EN is γr. Recall that each EN receives a matrices of shares.
We assume that each user can upload only one share to one
EN at a time. The upload is illustrated in Fig. 2, in which
the blue segments correspond to the upload phase. We start
by uploading the first matrix of shares to EN e0, continue
with EN e1, and proceed until all ENs have received their first
matrix of shares. This process is repeated with the remaining
matrices of shares until EN ej has received the a matrices of
shares {S(h) | h ∈ Isj}, j ∈ [e]. EN ej receives its (h+ 1)-th
matrix of shares S(φ
s
j(h)) at normalized time
L˜up,hj = γr(eh+ j + 1),
and the total normalized upload latency of the private scheme
becomes L˜upP = γ · r · e · a.
After an EN has received its first matrix of shares, it
enters the computation phase. As mentioned earlier, the ENs
experience a random setup time before they can start their
computations. This is illustrated by the red segments in Fig. 2.
For EN ej this phase incurs a normalized latency of λj/τ .
Once set up, the ENs start their computations on the first
assigned matrix of shares. In total, p IRs of the form WlS(h)
have to be computed for each assigned matrix of shares S(h)
by EN ej , where l ∈ Iwj and h ∈ Isj . This incurs a normalized
latency of p ·m/e, because each Wl has m/e rows and hence,
the ENs compute u ·m/e inner products for each of the p IRs.
In the case an EN has not received another matrix of
shares before finishing the currently assigned computations,
it remains idle until it receives another matrix of shares to
compute on. This can be seen in yellow in Fig. 2. For h ∈ [a],
the normalized time at which EN ej starts to compute on the
(h+ 1)-th assigned matrix of shares, i.e., on S(φ
s
j(h)), is
L˜start,hj = max
{
L˜start,h−1j + p
m
e
, L˜up,hj
}
, for h > 0,
with
L˜start,0j =
λj
τ
+ L˜up,0j .
The computational phase continues at least until the computa-
tions in (2) are obtained, i.e., until there are at least k distinct
IRs of the form WlS(h), h ∈ [n], for each l ∈ [e]. This ensures
that a given user ui can recover Wxi. It can be beneficial
to continue computing products to reduce the communication
latency in the download phase, as we discuss next.
B. Download
In the download phase we can make use of joint beamform-
ing opportunities to reduce the latency by serving multiple
users at the same time. An IR WlS(h) that is computed
at ρl,h ENs incurs a normalized communication latency of
γ/min{ρl,h, u}. Hence, a higher multiplicity of computed IRs
across different ENs will reduce the communication latency in
the download phase. At the same time, the repeated IRs have
to be computed first, thereby increasing the computational
latency. This tradeoff can be optimized to reduce the overall
latency. Assume the optimum is reached after EN ej∗ has
computed the IR Wφwj (l∗)S
(φsj(h
∗)). This gives a normalized
computation latency of
L˜comp = L˜start,h
∗
j∗ + (l
∗ + 1)
m
e
.
After the computation phase has finished, the ENs coop-
eratively send the computed IRs WlS(h) simultaneously to
multiple users in descending order of their multiplicity ρl,h
until the computations in (2) are available to the users. More
precisely, for each Wl the ENs send the k IRs with the highest
multiplicities to the users. Then, a given user ui can decode
the SSS to obtain the desired computation Wxi. For a fixed
l, let Hmaxl = argmaxA⊆[n],|A|=k
∑
h∈A ρl,h be the set of
indices h of the k largest ρl,h. This results in a normalized
communication latency of
L˜comm = γ
e−1∑
l=0
∑
h∈Hmaxl
1
min{ρl,h, u} ,
and the overall normalized latency becomes
L˜ = L˜start,h
∗
j∗ + (l
∗ + 1)
m
e
+ γ
e−1∑
l=0
∑
h∈Hmaxl
1
min{ρl,h, u} . (7)
V. OPTIMIZATION AND NUMERICAL RESULTS
We start by explaining how to choose the parameters of
the proposed scheme so that the overall normalized latency
L˜ in (7), consisting of upload, computation, and download
latencies, is minimized for a given privacy level z. To reduce
the upload latency, it may be beneficial to contact fewer ENs
than the maximum number of ENs available, denoted by emax,
rγ pm/e
rγ λ1/τ
rγ
L˜ = 0
EN e0
EN e1
EN e2
latencyL˜start,00 L˜
start,1
0
Fig. 2. Upload and computing schedule. For each EN ej , the upload times rγ
are shown in blue, the random setup times in red, the times pm/e to compute
p IRs in green, and possible idle times in yellow. All times are normalized.
to which a user can connect. Additionally, storing fewer than
µe submatrices of W at the ENs can be advantageous, because
the ENs will start computations sooner on the later shares.
Thus, we can choose p ≤ µe.
From the combinatorial designs, it follows that the number
of shares n per user can be at most equal to e, while the
value of the SSS threshold k is constrained by the choices
of z, e, n, and p. First, recall that the total number of shares
per user assigned to each EN is a = dde/pe · n/ee, which
means that any z ENs have access to a · z possibly distinct
shares of each user. Given that this set of shares must not leak
any information about the private data {xi}, we have to pick
k ≥ az+1. According to Corollary 1, for a given Wl, waiting
for k distinct products allows to recover the computationWlxi
for each user ui. Note that there is no reason to pick k larger
than az + 1, since then the users have to wait for more
products, leading to reduced straggler mitigation and increased
computational latency. Therefore, we set k = az + 1. Finally,
we need to verify that all constraints on n are fulfilled for the
chosen parameter values, i.e., k ≤ n ≤ e (for the scheme to
be feasible), n ≥ k (for the SSS to work), and n ≤ e (from
the combinatorial designs).
We have chosen pi = (0 e− 1 e− 2 · · · 1) and performed
an exhaustive search for the minimum expected overall nor-
malized latency L˜ given in (7) over all valid parameter tuples
(e, n, p) for a given privacy level z. For each tuple we varied
the number of total (not necessarily distinct) IRs to wait for
across all ENs for each Wl, in order to minimize the latency.
We generated 106 instances of the random setup times {λj}
in the simulation of the scheme in order to obtain an accurate
estimate of the expected overall normalized latency.
In Fig. 3, we compare the expected overall normalized
latency of the proposed private scheme with the nonprivate
MDS-repetition scheme in [8]. We plot the overall normal-
ized latency versus γ for different privacy levels z. For the
presented scenario, the users have access to a maximum of
emax = 9 ENs, which can store up to a fraction of µ = 2/3 of
the matrix W with dimensions m = 600 and r = 50. The ENs
need τ = 0.0005 time units to compute one inner product over
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Fig. 3. Overall normalized latency as a function of γ for different privacy
levels z of the proposed scheme compared to the nonprivate MDS-repetition
scheme in [8]. The parameters are µ = 2/3, τ = 0.0005, η = 0.8, emax =
9, m = 600, and r = 50.
GF(q)50 for each of the users, and the straggling parameter is
set to η = 0.8. Providing privacy against a single EN (z = 1)
yields an increase in latency for γ = 8 by a factor of about
2.4 compared to the nonprivate MDS-repetition scheme in [8].
For z = 2, the latency increases by a factor of about 3.5, while
it increases to 5.7 and 10.0 for z = 3 and 4, respectively.
One of the factors that leads to an increased latency is the
upload. In the nonprivate scheme, the users can broadcast their
private data vectors to all ENs simultaneously, whereas in the
private scheme, the users have to unicast their shares to the
ENs sequentially. In Fig. 4, we show the impact of the upload
on the proposed private scheme and the nonprivate MDS-
repetition scheme in [8]. For both schemes, for γ = 8, the
upload takes about 13% of the overall latency, which means
that for the private scheme the latency increases by around
1500 time units, whereas for the nonprivate scheme it increases
by only 700 time units.
VI. CONCLUSION
We presented a privacy-preserving scheme that allows mul-
tiple users in an edge computing network to offload compu-
tations to edge servers for distributed linear inference, while
keeping their data private to a number of edge servers or their
corresponding communication links. The proposed scheme
uses secret sharing to provide user data privacy and mitigate
the effect of straggling servers, and partial repetitions to enable
joint beamforming opportunities in the download phase in
order to reduce the communication latency. The parameters of
the scheme were optimized in order to minimize the overall
latency incurred by the upload of data to the servers, the
computation, and the transmission of partial computations
back to the users.
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